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PEOPLE

v.

BOYLES

[45 C.2d

[Crim. No. 5766. In Bank. Nov. 29, 1955.]

THE PEOPLE, Appellant, v. MAXINE ANN BOYLES,
Respondent .

•

(1] OriminaJ Law-Evidence-Evidence Wrongfully Obtained.Where officers waited and watched for someone to enter a
hotel room, and one of them grabbed defendant's hands as she
entered the room and found bin dies of heroin in one hand,
any trespass on their part was entirely unrelated to the securing of the evidence they obtained, and could not render that
evidence inadmissible.
(2] Searches and Seizures-Justification for.-A search incident to
an arrest cannot be justified in the absence of "reasonable
cause" under Pen. Code, § 836, merely because it revealed that
defendant was in fact guilty of a felony.
(3] Arrest-Without Warrant.-An arrest cannot be justified
under Pen. Code, § 836, subd. 1, when there is no evidence
of anything apparent to the officer's senses before the arrest
and search to indicate that defendant was committing or attempting to commit a public offense in his presence.
[4] Searches and Seizures-Justification for.- Where there is no
evidence of anything apparent to the officer's senses before the
arrest and search to indicate that defendant was committing or
attempting to commit a public offense in his presence the
search may be justified only if it was incidental to a lawful
arrest under Pen. Code, § 836, subd. 3.
[6] ld.-Time of Making.-If an arrest under Pen. Code, § 836,
subd. 3, was lawful, the search incident thereto would not be unlawful merely because it preceded rather than followed the
arrest.
[6] ld.-Justification for.-Under Pen. Code, § 836, subd. 3, authorizing an officer to make an arrest when a felony has in fact been
committed and he has reasonable cause for believing that
the person arrested committed it, evidence other than that
turned up in a search is present in any case in which the
officer has reasonable cause to believe defendant guilty of a
felony, and when his belief of defendant's guilt is based on
reasonable cause and a felony has in fact been committed,
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 127; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 393
et seq.
[2] See Oal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq. j Am.Jur.,
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 409; [2,4-6] Searches
n nd Seizures, § 1 j [3] Arrest, § 7; [7, 9] Arrest, § 12; [8] Criminal
Law, § 1269.
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not only are the requirements of subd. 3 satisfied, but a search
incident to an arrest thereunder is reasonable.
[7] Arrest - Without Warrant - Reasonable Cause.-Since the
court and not the arresting officer must make the determination
whether the officer's belief that a felony was being committed
at the time of the arrest was based on reasonable cause, the
officer must testify to the facts or information known to him
on which his belief is based.
[Sa, Sb] Criminal Law-Appeal-Who May Urge Error.-Where,
at the time the prosecuting attorney in a narcotics case
sought to establish the basis for the arresting officer's belief
that a felony was being committed as justification for the
arrest, defendant objected and the committing magistrate
ruled that the matter should be gone into on cross-examination,
at which time defendant limited the examination to a determination that the officer had not personally witnessed any
activity of defendant with regard to narcotics, defendant
could not successfully contend on appeal that the evidence
before the committing magistrate was necessarily illegally obtained and therefore insufficient to support the information.
[9] Arrest - Without Warrant - Reasonable Cause.-Reasonable
cause to justify an arrest may consist of information obtained
from others and is not limited to evidence that would be admissible at the trial on the issue of guilt.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County granting motion to set aside an information. David Coleman, Judge. Reversed.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, William E. James,
Deputy Attorney General, S. Ernest Roll, District Attorney
(Los Angeles), Jere J. Sullivan and Lewis Watnick, Deputy
District Attorneys, for Appellant.
Alan Ross for Respondent.
A. L. Wirin and Fred Okrand as Amici Curiae on behalf
of Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J .-By information defendant was charged
with one count of possessing heroin in violation of Health
and Safety Code, section 11500, a felony. Her motion to set
the information aside (see Pen. Code, § 995) was grantl!d
on the ground that all of the evidence of the crime other than
admissions was obtained by an illegal search of her person
in violation of her constitutional rights. The People appeal.
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At about 10 a. m. on May 2, 1955, three officers of the
Los Angeles Police Department obtained the key to a hotel
room from the manager of the hotel and entered the room
and waited. About 11 a. m. defendant knocked on the door
q,r made some signal. The officers opened the door and one
of them grabbed defendant's hands and found two bindles
of heroin in her right hand. One of the officers testified
that he asked defendant "if she had any more stuff. She said
no. That is all there was. I asked her how much was there
and she said a gram and a half. I asked her where she got
it and she said she scored it from a friend down on Second
Street. I asked her what it cost her. She said $30." He
also testified that he believed a felony was being committed
at the time of the arrest. The prosecuting attorney then
asked what reason he had for his belief, and defendant
objected on the ground that the answer would be hearsay
and a conclusion of the witness. The prosecuting attorney
stated that he had a right to show that the arrest was legaJ
and that the search was incident to the arrest, but the court
indicated that since the officer had made a positive statement
as to his belief, any question as to its validity should come
from cross-examination. On cross-examination the officer was
asked, "You personally did not witness any activity of this
defendant with regard to narcotics before the date of this
arrest, did you Y" He answered, "I did not." No further
questions with respect to the basis of his belief were asked.
It does not appear from the record who was the regular
occupant of the hotel room where the officers waited. They
did not have a search warrant or a warrant for defendant's
arrest.
[1] It should be noted at the outset that whether or not
the officers were trespassers in the room where they waited
for defendant is immaterial in this case. It does not appear
that the room was searched, and even if it was, nothing that
may have been found in the room was offered or introduced
in evidence. It is apparent that the officers were waiting
and watching for someone to enter the room. Since they
had the cooperation of the manager of the hotel, however,
any such person could have been apprehended just as well
from some other vantage point nearby without committing
any trespass, and thus their ability to arrest and search defendant was not dependent on their presence in the room.
Under these circumstances, the trespass, if any, was entirely
unrelated and collateral to the securing of the evidence to
which defendant objects, and it could not therefore render
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that evidence inadmissible. (Goldman v. United States, 316
U.S. 129, 134-135 [62 8.Ct. 993, 86 L.Ed. 1322]; see also
United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 70-71 [64 S.Ct. 896,
88 L.Ed. 1140] ; McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95, 99-100
[47 S.Ct. 259, 71 L.Ed. 556] ; United States v. Lee, 274 U.S.
559, 563 [47 S.Ct. 746, 71 L.Ed. 1202].)
The attorney general contends that the search in this case
was incidental to a lawful arrest and was therefore reasonable Defendant, on the other hand, contends that the search
preceded the arrest and was not incidental thereto and that
in any event the arrest was unlawful.
[2] In People v. Brown, ante, p. 640 [290 P.2d 528],
we held that a search incident to an arrest could not be
justified in the absence of "reasonable cause" under Penal
Code, section 836, merely because it revealed that defendant
was in fact guilty of a felony. [3] We also held in that
case that an arrest could not be justified under subdivision 1
of section 836 when there was no evidence of anything apparent to the officer's senses before the arrest and search
that defendant was committing or attempting to commit a
public offense in his presence. [4] Accordingly, since there
was no such evidence in this case, the search may be justified
only if it was incidental to a lawful arrest under subdivision 3
of section 836. [5] If, however, an arrest under that subdivision was lawful, the search incident thereto would not
be unlawful merely because it preceded rather than followed
the arrest. (People v. Simon, ante, p. 645 [290 P.2d 531].)
[6] Section 836, subdivision 3, provides that an officer
may make an arrest without a warrant "When a felony has
in fact been committed, and he has reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it."
Defendant contends that to justify a search incident to
an arrest under this subdivision there must be evidence, other
than any turned up in the search, that a felony has in fact
been committed. Such evidence is present in any case in
which the· officer has reasonable cause to believe defendant
guilty of a felony. When his belief of defendant's guilt is
based on reasonable cause and a felony has in fact been
committed, not only are the requirements of subdivision 3
satisfied, but a search incident to an arrest thereunder is
reasonable. (See United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581", 591
[68 8.Ct. 222, 92 I..J.Ed 210] ; Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 15 I6S S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436] j In re Dizon, 41
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Ca1.2d 756, 761-762 [264 P.2d 513]; ct., People v. Brown,
ante, p. 640 [290 P.2d 528].)
[7] In the present case one of the arresting officers testified that he believed a felony was being committed at the
time of the arrest. Since the court and not the officer must
make the determination whether the officer's belief is based
upon reasonable cause, the officer must testify to the facts
or information known to him on which his belief is based.
(United States v. Bianco, 189 F.2d 716, 719; United States
v. Heitner) 149 F.2d 105, 106-107; see also Grau v. United
States, 287 U.S. 124, 127 [53 8.0t. 38, 77 L.Ed. 212] ; Byars
v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 [47 8.0t. 248, 71 L.Ed. 520] ;
People v. Tarantino, ante, p. 590 [290 P.2d 505]; Michel
v. Smith, 188 Cal. 199, 206 [205 P. 113].) [Sa] Under the
peculiar circumstances of this case, however, defendant is
not in a position to challenge the failure of the record to
establish the basis for the officer's belief. When the prosecuting attorney sought to establish that basis, defendant objected
and the committing magistrate ruled that the matter should
be gone into on cross-examination. At that time defendant
limited the examination to a determination that the officer
had not personally witnessed any activity of defendant with
regard to narcotics. [9] It is settled, however, that reasonable
cause to justify an arrest may consist of information obtained
from others and is not limited to evidence that would be
admissible at the trial on the issue of guilt. (Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 171-176 [69 8.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed.
1879]; United States v. Li Fat Tong, 152 F.2d 650, 652;
Aitken v. White, 93 Cal.App.2d 134, 145 [208 P.2d 788];
Oook v. Singer Sewing Machine 00.,138 Cal.App. 418, 422-423
[32 P.2d 430].) [Sb] Thus in the present case it is entirely
possible that the officer's belief that defendant had narcotics
in her possession was fully justified by reliable information
obtained by him from others in carrying out his duties. Since
defendant successfully prevented the prosecution from presenting such evidence, if any, she cannot now contend that
the evidence before the committing magistrate was necessarily
illegally obtained and therefore insufficient to support the
information.
The order is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J.,
and McComb, J. pro tem.,· concurred.
• Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.

